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Abstract
During the last decade, there has been a significant bias towards bond financing on emerging
markets, with private investors relying on a bail-out of bonds by the international community.
The bias has been a main cause for recent excessive fragility of international capital markets.
The paper shows how collective action clauses in bonds contracts help to involve the private
sector in risk sharing. It argues that such clauses, as a market based instrument, will raise
spreads for emerging market debt and so help to correct a market failure towards excessive
bond finance. Recent pressure by the IMF to involve the private sector is facing a conflict be-
tween the principle to honour existing contracts and the principle of equal treatment of bond-
holders.
Involving the private sector in solving financial crises is now seen as a key step for successful
reform of the so called „International Financial Architecture.“ „Bailing in“ has become a
catchword in official statements (see Fischer 1999). Increasing pressure is put on bond holders
to share the burden of rescheduling the debt of sovereign countries in distress. These moves
are based on the feeling that international capital markets are biased towards bond financing.
For a long time, private lenders, relying on the sanctity of debt contracts, felt safe to invest
their money in sovereign debt -  trusting that they will be either lucky enough to get out first in
case of emergency or otherwise will be bailed out by international financial institutions.
Indeed, whereas bank loans have been heavily affected by the Latin American debt crisis during
the 80s, there has never been a major default on bonds issued by sovereign debtor countries
during the post war period. Bonds appeared to be senior to bank debt. Their exemption from
rescheduling was not based on a special legal status, but was rather due to two other factors:
(1)  The enormous practical difficulties involved in cutting a deal with a diffuse atomised num-
ber of often unknown bondholders
(2)  The negligible part bonds played in financing since the end of world war II.2
The latter changed dramatically during the 1990s. In that period, emerging market financing
was characterised by two trends: (1) Shorter maturity of bank loans and (2) a shift away from
direct bank lending towards equity and bond financing. At the beginning of the 90s, long term
bank loans dating from the 1980s have been restructured and then transformed into “Brady”
bonds. Table 1 illustrates how bond finance substituted bank credit. This allowed banks to se-
curitise risky loans.1 The proportion of bond lending increased dramatically, changing the debt
structure significantly. Bond markets became the main source of finance for emerging mar-
kets.2 This trend has been reinforced by the fact that international funds came to rescue inves-
tors during the Tequila crisis in Mexico in 1995. Many observers saw this as an open invitation
for both debtor and creditor to free ride at the expense of international tax payers.
Both the shift towards shorter maturity of bank loans and towards bond financing contributed
to excessive fragility of emerging market finance at the end of the 20
th century. As shown in
table 2, after the Asian and Russian crisis in 1998, there was a dramatic reversal of the flow of
private credit to emerging market economies (see also BIS 2000). Private credit turned nega-
tive, whereas both long term foreign direct investment FDI and official flows remained fairly
robust. Spreads on emerging markets increased dramatically (compare figure 1).
Table 1: Debt Structure of Emerging Markets
% of foreign debt  Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank
Bilateral Credit Bank Credit Bonds
1970 55,5 8,2 4,1
1980 32,9 33,6 5,0
1990 35,3 23,6 9,6
1997 37,0 12,3 21,2
Table 2: Emerging Market Economies External Financing (net, billions of dollars)
                                               
1 The same procedure is now being applied to Russian bank loans. The London club (a group of commercial
creditors) agreed in February 2000 with Russia to restructure $32bn (£19.8bn) of Soviet-era debt: After writing
off 36 per cent of the principal, the remaining debt will be repackaged as Euro bonds with 30 years' maturity.
2 This trend for emerging markets is not restricted to public financing; the same is true for the private sector:
„Between 1983–89 and 1990–98, the share of bonds in total financing rose from 27 percent to 46 percent, while
the share of equities rose from 1 percent to 8 percent, with the share of loans falling from 72 percent to only 45
percent. This reflects the general trend toward securitized rather than bank-intermediated financing, the re-
cently growing importance of new nonbank investors in emerging markets, and the limited secondary market
trading of bank loans.“ (IMF 1999b, International Capital Market Report, p 103).3
Source: Institute of International Finance, 24.1. 2000
1996 1997 1998 1999 e 2000 e
External Financing (net) 335,5 304,6 200,6 160,6 202,2
Private flows 327,9 265,7 147,8 148,5 193,1
  Equity Investment 125,4 141,0 131,5 155,8 153,5
    direct investment (FDI) 91,7 115,3 117,9 138,8 119,8
    Portfolio investment 33,7 25,7 13,7 17,0 33,7
  Private creditors 202,5 124,7 26,2 -7,1 39,6
    Commercial banks 116,8 33,5 -49,0 -39,1 -3,1
    nonbank private credi-
tors
85,6 91,2 65,2 32,0 42,7
Official flows 7,6 38,9 52,8 11,9 9,1
    Multilateral Credit 6,6 29,0 36,4 4,0 9,9
    Bilateral Credit 1,0 9,8 16,5 7,9 -0,8
Figure 1: Spreads of rated bond issues in emerging markets
xx
The increase in bond issuance will be reflected in a rapid increase in redemption payments in
the coming years. Private capital flows have become so big that potential financing gaps faced
by emerging economies can no longer be expected to be covered by international rescue pack-
ages. As argued by Eichengreen (1999), IMF (1999a) and the Council on Foreign Relations
(1999), creditors will hardly be able to avoid in the future a heavier burden in periods of dis-
tress.
Both IMF and the Paris Club (a voluntary group of official representatives of creditor govern-
ments dealing with countries in financial distress) have recently taken efforts to push for par-
ticipation of private debt holders. Countries in extreme debt overhang get strong signals that a
debt rescheduling with private creditors is a condition for further support - much in the same
spirit that official creditors in the Paris Club require "comparable" concessions from private
creditors (as a burden-sharing quid pro quo) for their own debt rescheduling concessions. Ec-
uador, Pakistan and Ukraine became the first test cases. Experience with measures for bailing
in has been extremely limited up to now, so countries trying to bind in private debtors are fac-
ing high risks. Evidently, there is a trade off between immediate cash-flow benefits and possibly4
reduced subsequent access to capital markets. The crucial issue is how it will affect future ac-
cess to capital markets.
Not surprisingly, private investors in emerging markets warn that such a policy will increase
the cost of borrowing for emerging market countries by widening the yield spreads. In a posi-
tion paper on private burden-sharing, the Association of Emerging Markets Traders (EMTA)
argues that it would „put at risk a decade's progress in diversifying financial risk more widely
throughout the financial system and restoring access of Emerging Markets countries to the
benefits, as well as the disciplines, of international capital markets.“ Folkerts-Landau /Garber
(1999) from Deutsche Bank, Global Markets reject the idea with similar arguments. In the
same vain, the Institute of International Finance, representing banks and institutional investors,
is trying hard to lobby against „involuntary techniques involving the private sector.“
For obvious reasons, emerging market countries are also reluctant to introduce voluntarily
measures which would raise their own costs of finance. To counter these arguments and to
sweeten the idea of bailing in, proponents frequently claim that the yield spread might even be
lowered by such measures (see Eichengreen 1999, p68, Haldane 1999, p196, and Fischer
1999). When a change in the legal structure of bond contracts makes debt renegotiation easier,
coordination costs among atomised debtors in case of distress are reduced. So deadlocks and
costly liquidation of illiquid assets will be avoided, making both debtor and creditor better off.
Below, a simple example illustrates how a redesign of contract can reduce coordination costs.
But it would be completely wrong to conclude that mandatory bailing in clauses might reduce
spreads. Such a claim is either naive or  preposterous. The main purpose of binding in the pri-
vate sector is exactly to correct a market failure - the bias towards bond finance and short term
lending, resulting from moral hazard both on the sides of lenders and creditors. If these meas-
ures work, they should help to make a credible commitment for not bailing out private inves-
tors. By construction, properly designed, they should correct wrong price signals by raising the
costs of short term lending and so dampen short term capital flows. If, instead, spreads went
down, price signals would go in the wrong direction; turning the whole exercise into a failure.
Bailing in clauses work in a way comparable to imposing short term capital controls. By
throwing sand into the wheels of international capital flows, they are frequently said to deter
investors from lending money and thus deprive emerging countries from the benefits of global-5
isation. It is no coincidence that the argument closely resembles those of the lobby groups
against bailing in. Both measures intend to correct the alleged market failure of excessive mar-
ket volatility. If there is a bias both towards bond financing and short term bank loans, markets
cannot perform efficiently unless a change in institutional design raises the price for these ac-
tivities - either explicitly or implicitly.
The real issue is whether market failures can be corrected in a way encouraging long term in-
vestment instead. A proper design should throw sand into the wheels of short term capital
flows and at the same time grease the engine of long term financing. The theory of market fail-
ure tells us that market based incentive mechanisms are superior to rigid instruments. To bor-
row a phrase from environmental economics, a clever design should use taxes rather than
quota. Unilateral declarations of a standstill by a debtor country or the forced rescheduling of
bonds in breach of original contracts belong to the latter category, just as rigid capital controls.
In contrast, market based instruments would change the nature of bond contracts ex ante in a
transparent and predictable way. They work as an explicit tax on bonds to correct for negative
externalities and thus allow private agents to react smoothly to price incentives. Recently, a
number of such market based instruments have been suggested. The main focus is on how to
change the legal structure of bonds so as to ease restructuring. Collective action clauses in
bond contracts play a prominent role. Other market based instruments include the arrangement
of contingent credit lines from the private banking sector and the use of derivatives in debt
instruments (for an extensive study, see IMF 1999a).
As pointed out, there is a lot of confusion in the debate about the impact of such measures.
Partly, this may be due to the fact that different lobby groups try to push their own interest.
But it is also due to the complexity of the issue: Different kinds of market failure are involved,
calling for a sophisticated second best analysis. The following sections try to disentangle the
main issues.6
Financial Fragility and International Capital Markets
At first sight, the rapid substitution of bank lending by bond financing during the last decade
appears to be a healthy process. It might simply indicate that emerging markets begin to par-
ticipate in the benefits of modern financial engineering. With sophisticated technologies reduc-
ing transaction costs, these markets become less dependent on information intensive bank-
intermediation. When securitisation goes global, private capital can flow much more efficiently
to those countries with the highest expected return. If this view were correct, interventions in
the legal framework aiming to discourage bond financing would be detrimental. As Folkerts-
Landau/Garber (1999, 11) argue: „Their ultimate result, if implemented, would be primarily to
shift the global financial system back one generation to a relationship mode of banking.“
Indeed, relative to what the theory of perfect capital markets suggests, international diversifi-
cation of financial trade is still extremely limited. Nevertheless, reducing the extent of bond
finance may paradoxically contribute to more efficient sharing of risks. At present, it is mainly
the creditors who benefit from securitisation. By making use of secondary markets, they can
diversify risk according to individual needs. In contrast, emerging market countries as debtor
are hardly able to diversify, even though they have an enormous need for global risk sharing:
Under traditional debt contracts, obligations are fixed as long as no default is declared. Credi-
tors do not provide any explicit contractual insurance, adjusting the payment load when coun-
tries are hit by negative shocks.
Modern instruments such as indexed bonds or catastrophe-linked derivatives could provide this
kind of insurance: These sophisticated means of finance - more like equity than debt - would
automatically reduce the amount of debt service in case of bad shocks. Emerging market
bonds, however, are usually of the non-indexed type, so the benefits of modern globalisation
are more a myth rather than reality.
Obviously, there are good reasons why sophisticated bonds are so rare for emerging markets.
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems reduce the scope for trading risks. Under perfect
insurance, there would always be strong incentives to claim bad luck or even declare strategic
default (see Illing 1999). So bonds can be indexed safely only to events which are truly exoge-
nous (such as world wide shocks). Incentive problems are aggravated among sovereign coun-
tries: In the absence of international bankruptcy courts, contracts are difficult to enforce. The7
incompleteness of markets is an endogenous response to incentive problems. Taking this into
account, it no longer seems surprising that international trade is far behind the first best out-
come under perfect financial markets.
The lack of explicit market insurance is the main reason for the increased fragility of financial
markets during last 20 years. Under debt contracts, severe shocks lead to default. Leverage
effects amplify the impact of negative shocks, creating excessive volatility. Feedback mecha-
nisms may cause contagion to other markets. World wide safety nets have been installed to
cope with the fragility of financial markets. Explicit market insurance is substituted by an im-
plicit reliance on international bail-out.
Thus, investors are encouraged to extend bond finance beyond the efficient level, relying on
the international community coming to rescue when default is looming. The combination of
debt contracts and implicit bailout introduces a bias towards excessive bond financing relative
to the second best outcome. The larger the extent of bond finance, the more likely financial
crises and the heavier their impact. Evidently, this bias is a main factor contributing to in-
creased frequency of financial crises.
Because of the high costs of financial crises and contagion, a threat not to bail out is hardly
credible. An obvious solution is to let creditors participate in risk sharing. How can changes in
the legal structure of debt contracts help to correct the market failure? The answer requires a
careful understanding of the underlying incentive problems. At least three different moral haz-
ard problems are involved, working in opposite directions: (1) The creditor’s incentive to liq-
uidate assets in order to secure a large slice for himself; (2) the debtor’s incentive to declare
strategic default and (3) both creditors and debtors incentive to free ride on the international
community.
American vs English style bonds - The Coordination Game
Most outstanding emerging market bonds are issued according to American law. This gives
bond holders a very strong bargaining position. There are no contractual provisions allowing
qualified majorities to modify the terms of a bond and to impose these modifications on minor-
ity holders. In the event of default, there are hardly any limitations for individual bondholders
to initiate and benefit from legal action on their claims. So renegotiation is extremely costly.8
Acceleration clauses aggravate the problem: If bondholders representing more than 25 per cent
of the principal vote for acceleration, the issuing country is forced to accelerated (immediate)
repayment of all principal and interest due in the event of default.
The idea of these provisions was initially to protect individual bondholders against the risk that
big institutional investors cut a deal with the debtor at the expense of diversified minority hold-
ers. The consequence, however, is that any restructuring is bound to fail under diffuse owner-
ship. It can lead to litigation, loss of value, and perhaps even loss of access for other borrow-
ers. This will be exacerbated if “vulture funds”—investors that are skilled in extracting pay-
ments from troubled borrowers— were to increase their presence in emerging markets.
There have been several proposals to lower costs of renegotiation. They follow the legal terms
of “British-style” bonds. These bonds contain “collective action clauses” that allow for:
n Collective representation—clauses that provide procedures for bondholders to organise and
designate a representative to negotiate on their behalf with the debtor. Under British law, a
trustee is appointed acting on behalf of bondholders - a bondholders analogue to the Paris
resp. London Club. In the Paris club, official representatives arrange terms for rescheduling
officially held public debt, whereas the London Club is dealing with the restructuring of
bank loans. Bank advisory committees handle these negotiations from the creditor side.
n Qualified majority voting—clauses that enable changes to be made in the terms of a bond
contract without the unanimous consent of bondholders, and thus prevent a small number of
dissident bondholders from blocking an agreement beneficial to the majority. Under British
law, rather than insisting on unanimity, typically a 75% majority is required to change terms.
At a bondholders’ meeting, there is a 25% quorum for attendance, so the 75 % rule may
translate to as little as just above 18.75%.
n Sharing clauses among bondholders—clauses requiring bondholders to share the proceeds
of litigation against a debtor with all other creditors, thus reducing the incentive for individ-
ual creditors to take independent legal action against the debtor. Sharing clauses change the
threat point significantly in favour of the debtor: When bondholders have to part their win-
nings with other investors, the incentive to pursue debtors is drastically reduced.9
The Coordination Game
In a simple example, we illustrate how the legal structure crucially affects the outcome of the
renegotiation process. The rules of the game determine the threat point. American style bonds
give bond holders a strong bargaining position. They have de facto senior status. This creates,
however, serious coordination problems among diversified creditors. Consider a bond with
nominal value 100 and just 2 creditors, each holding half of the asset. With some probability p,
the issuing country is hit by a negative shock. If the shock triggers default, the country runs
into a severe insolvency crisis. Costly liquidation of illiquid assets reduces the liquidation value
of the bonds to just 40. If instead, the country is given time for restructuring, partial recovery
increases the present value of the bond to 70.
Under American law, each individual bond holder has a strong incentive to opt for litigatation,
thus appropriating as much as possible from the liquidation value for himself. Since all credi-
tors do the same, they face a prisoners dilemma (Figure 2a). All would benefit from coordi-
nated action, but it is a dominant strategy to block restructuring. Free riding results in ineffi-
cient liquidation, making both creditors and debtor worse off. Obviously the problem gets
worse with increasing number of creditors. Acceleration clauses aggravate the dilemma.
Restructure opt for
litigation
Restructure 35, 35 0, 40
opt for
litigation
40, 0 20, 20
Figure 2a Collective Action Problem: Coordination Dilemma
Restructure opt for
litigation
Restructure 35, 35 20, 20
opt for
litigation
20, 20 20, 20
Figure 2b: Equal Sharing Rule; Nonacceleration10
Sharing clauses change the nature of the game dramatically. Since benefits of legal action now
have to be shared equally, restructuring is the dominant strategy equilibrium (see figure 2b).
As the example shows, once in a crisis, all would benefit from legal arrangements making rene-
gotiation easier. When default probability p is fixed, such clauses could reduce spreads on
emerging market bonds significantly. As an illustration, assume the safe interest rate is 10%,
and creditors are risk neutral. The ex ante interest rate of American style bonds is determined
by the arbitrage equation p 0.4 + (1-p)  (1+r) = 1.1. For British style bonds we get instead
p  0.7 + (1-p)  (1+r) = 1.1. Take p=0.2. American bonds would have to charge an interest rate
r= 27.5%,  whereas interest on bonds with sharing clauses would reduce to r = 20%.
In a crisis, American style bonds cause high efficiency losses. To conclude that these type of
bonds are a sure sign of market failure would, however, be premature. Cost of renegotiation
are bound to affect default probability. The lower these costs, the higher the debtor’s incentive
to declare strategic default. By claiming a crisis, better conditions might be obtained in renego-
tiations. Of course, as long as default probability does not rise too much, the spread can still be
lower under British style bonds (in the example above, even for p=0.3 sharing clauses would
have a lower r).
But incentives for strategic default are rather high in case of sovereign debt. The reasons for
debtor countries to make repayments are not well understood. As Rogoff (1999) argues, re-
putational effects may not give sufficient incentives. The threat of foreign creditors to legally
harass them when they try to borrow and trade abroad after a default can be a much more ef-
fective enforcement mechanism. So the threat of a costly negotiation period may be the main
deterrence against moral hazard. Dooley (1999) presents a model in which costly negotiation is
necessary to support any level of positive international debt. The dead weight loss during a real
crisis is the price that has to be paid to make international financial trade sustainable.3
Free riding in the coordination game suggests that renegotiation costs should be lowered so as
to ease restructuring. On the other hand, raising renegotiation costs can reduce the risk of a
crisis happening. It depends on the specific case which effect dominates. When creditors and
                                               
3 Berglof/Roland/von Thadden (2000) show that, in an incomplete contract framework, having multiple credi-
tors increases the debt capacity of a firm. In their model, incentives to default strategically are increased as
well. They show that bankruptcy rules can prevent a run on the assets. For sovereign debt, however, there is no
international bankruptcy court.11
debtor rely on a bail-out, incentive problems become even more intricate. Renegotiations pre-
vent a solvency crisis under British style bonds. In contrast, under American style bonds, re-
payment of interest and principal to investors must be guaranteed. A crisis is triggered unless
international funds come to rescue. In the example above, an amount of 100 (1+r) -70 of pub-
lic funds is needed to prevent a run. With an implicit bail-out guarantee, ex ante spreads for
American style bonds would be lower than those with collective action clauses. The higher the
expectation of a bailout, the lower the spread relative to riskless bonds.
Empirical Evidence on Spreads
Before the Asian crisis in 1997, spreads of rated bond issues in emerging markets narrowed
down considerably (see figure 1), in line with the bail-out view. The real question, however, is
whether spreads of different types of bonds diverge. The empirical evidence is rather mixed up
to now. Some studies find no systematic effect. In a recent study, however, Eichengreen/
Mody (2000) claim to find significant differences between the two types when credit rating of
issuers is taken into account. They compare launch spreads of bonds issued under British and
American law in emerging markets between 1991 and 1998. For credit-worthy issuers, British
style bonds seem to reduce the cost of borrowing. With high reputation, strategic default may
be of no concern, and so benefits from an orderly restructuring process dominate. In contrast,
less credit-worthy issuers appear to pay higher spreads. For those bonds, strategic default ef-
fect seems to be the decisive factor.
These findings qualify the argument that collective action clauses would not be introduced vol-
untary - as argued in Eichengreen (1999) or by the Council on Foreign Relations (1999).4
1160 bonds were subject to UK law, and only 840 to US law. One might conclude that mar-
kets take into account reputation for strategic default when pricing bonds and so cope effi-
ciently with the first two types of moral hazard by a self selection of issuers. Most market par-
ticipants, however, concede that default on sovereign debt has not been a serious concern until
recently. Evidently, they have hardly been aware of the difference between legal structures (see
                                               
4 In their study, they argue: „The difficulty is that if only emerging-market bonds include these clauses, it
might be taken by the markets as a signal of their need to restructure; they will therefore not do it alone. No
signal would be forthcoming if the bonds of the most creditworthy borrowers also included such clauses.“12
IMF 1999b, p 89). Certainly, this was the case for some official representatives calling for
mandatory clauses.5
So the results Eichengreen/ Mody (2000) have to be treated with caution. If there was a sig-
nificant difference in spreads in the past, it is hard to see why less credit-worthy issuers should
have issued British-style bonds in the first place. It seems more likely that the law under which
bonds have been issued in the past is history dependent rather than result of deliberate choice.
Bonds of commonwealth countries are more likely to be UK based. It may be no coincidence
that Asian borrowers tended to issue more frequently under British law than borrowers from
other regions. Obviously, more evidence is needed. In particular, it would be worthwhile to
compare spreads of bonds issued by the same country under different law.
In any case, the results in Eichengreen/ Mody (2000) leave no doubt that mandatory collective
action clauses will indeed raise borrowing costs for issuers with low reputation in the future.
As was shown above in this paper, introducing such mandatory clauses would increase effi-
ciency. It would help to correct the third moral hazard problem- the bias towards bond financ-
ing. It will not be easy, however, to implement such a change. Evidently, there is a conflict
between two principles: (1) to honour existing bond contracts and (2) comparability of treat-
ment.
The first principle suggests that only new bonds issued from now on should be subject to these
changes. Such a process would, however, take a very long time, so it offers no solution for
current problems of countries in distress. The present IMF policy is trying both to honour ex-
isting contracts and to enforce, at the same time, bailing in on a voluntary, market based ap-
proach. This way, only bonds issued under British law have a realistic chance to be bailed in
right now (as is the case for Pakistan). But bailing out American style bonds obviously contra-
dicts the second principle. Such a policy would violate equal treatment of bond holders if the
type of bond has been history dependent in the past. It would even contradict the whole idea of
bailing in, if this type of bonds has been chosen by purpose to make restructuring costly to get
away in case of distress.
                                               
5 Fischer (1999) states: „It was only subsequently that many discovered that such bonds already exist, in the
form of British-style Trust-deed bonds.“13
The only way to honour both principles is a default on American style bonds, as in the case of
Ecuador. Such an outcome might be avoided by raising the implicit costs of litigation against
those sovereign countries who try to restructure under IMF support. Incentives to litigate may
be reduced when there is enough evidence of a lack of international support for enforcement of
such legal claims. Of course, a crucial condition for broad acceptance of such measures is that
the principle of comparability of treatment will be applied to all creditors - both public and pri-
vate. Neither bilateral or multilateral official creditors, nor vulture funds should be treated bet-
ter than bank loans, dispersed bondholders and institutional investors.14
Test Cases for Bailing In
Countries trying to bind in private debtors are facing high risks. Experience with measures for
bailing in has been extremely limited up to now. There is uncertainty how it will affect future
access to capital markets. For that reason, countries in financial trouble initially resisted pres-
sures to involve bond holders in restructuring. In the first half of 1999, the IMF tried to force
Pakistan and then Romania to restructure their bonds. But both countries ducked out at the
last minute and instead preferred to pay back the debt.
Then, Ukraine came under pressure to demand "comparable" concessions from private credi-
tors when it tried to reschedule official debt.6 In June 1999, Ukraine unsuccessfully tried to
restructure maturing debt as its hands were tied by the stringent conditions of an aid package
with the IMF. But as creditors threatened to declare the country into default if they weren’t
repaid in full, Ukraine scrambled to find alternative sources of financing7 to repay the debt
beginning of August.
Ecuador was chosen as the next test case. End of August, the IMF indicated that it would get
new loans only under condition of structural reforms and bail in of private creditors. But the
effort to restructure outstanding bonds failed in October 1999. Ecuador, being effectively
bankrupt and unable to service its debt, could not reach an agreement with its debtors. Inves-
tors, led by the New York hedge fund Gramercy Advisors, rejected its offer to swap part of its
debt. They assembled 35 per cent of  bondholders to vote for acceleration. Ecuador was the
first country to declare default both on Brady bonds and Eurobonds.
If the intention was to make bond holders in general aware of the risk of being bailed in, it did
not succeed. Quite the contrary: After Ecuador’s default, the yield spread on J. P. Morgan's
Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI+) narrowed.8 Obviously, Ecuador was seen as a special
                                               
6 By many observers, investors in Russia and Ukraine are considered to be the main culprits. The Council on
Foreign Relations (1999) argues: „If one wants to see what happens when moral hazard effects become large,
one need look no further than recent private capital flows to Russia and the Ukraine—widely known on Wall
Street as "the moral hazard play." Here, despite serious underlying weaknesses in the economic fundamentals,
investors were prepared to purchase large amounts of high-yielding government securities—presumably in
large part under the expectation that if conditions worsened, geopolitical and security concerns would prompt
G-7 governments and the IMF to bail them out. In the first half of 1998, Russia placed four issues of eurobonds
that doubled the outstanding stock.“
7 Not surprisingly, these funds have been raised by adding an additional tranche with face value of DM 531
million to an - American style - DM bond issued initially in 1998, maturing in 2001.
8 According to BIS (2000), this may partly be due to special factors, reversing the preceding rise in anticipation
of an eventual default. Several governments (Mexico, Brazil and the Philippines) used the low prices before15
case by investors. Market participants expressed doubt that the same principle would be ap-
plied to big countries, such as Russia and Brazil.
Pakistan’s effort to restructure had more success when it came under trouble again in Decem-
ber 1999. More than 90 per cent of holders accepted the offer to exchange Eurobond issues
with a total face value of $610m for new six-year Eurobonds, paying a fixed interest rate of
10%. Two factors helped restructuring: Pakistan’s bonds are issued under British law and have
trustees. In addition, most of the debt was in the hands of a small group of institutional inves-
tors on which pressure can be put on more easily.
The latest guinea pig being pushed into debt restructuring has been, again, Ukraine. The coun-
try is suffering from a highly bunched debt service profile. With reserves of only $1.2bn, it
faces debt repayments of more than $3.2bn this year. In February 2000, Ukraine offered to
swap $2.6 billion-worth of new international bonds with seven years maturity (paying a fixed
interest rate of 10-11%). All bonds will be exchanged at par and repaid on a semi-annual basis.
The offer represented a premium of about 30 per cent to the trading price on secondary mar-
ket. The offer expired on March 15. Most of the Eurobonds have been issued in Luxembourg
under British style law, requiring consent of a qualified majority of 75%. The DM bond, how-
ever, was issued under German law which follows the American style.9
About half of the bonds is held by private investors. Between 3,000 and 5,000 retail investors
held bonds, mainly in Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Belgium. These diffuse investors were
reached via internet, e-mail and a press campaign, advertising the offer in several newspapers.
According to ING Barings, the lead manager of the exchange, there was broad acceptance
among institutional investors, while private bond holders were waiting until the last minute to
hand in their tender. But finally, far more than 85% of total bondholders are said to have
agreed. Nevertheless, the period for acceptance was extended for several weeks. The success
of the deal is an important boost to the IMF' s attempt for burden sharing between taxpayers
and private investors.
                                                                                                                                                  
October to buy back or swap Brady obligations in order to reduce interest payments or free up collateral. These
transactions pushed Brady bond prices up, which have a heavy weight in the EMBI.
9 There has been controversy whether collective action clauses would, in principle, be allowed for foreign sov-
ereign bond issues under German law. Recently, the federal ministry of finance issued in a statement that the
general principle of freedom of contract applies equally to private and sovereign foreign bonds.16
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